

331

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT NO.		50X1
SUBJECT	Soviet Army Infantry Tactics	DATE DISTR.	MAY 3 1955	
	50X1	NO. OF PAGES	22	
DATE OF INFO.		REQUIREMENT NO.		50X1
PLACE ACQUIRED		REFERENCES		
DATE ACQUIRED				

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

50X1

LIBRARY SUBJECT AND AREA CODES 5/55
223.41 N

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

50X1

STATE	#x	ARMY	#x	NAVY	#x	AIR	#x	FBI	#x	AEC						
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; by "#".)																

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

50X1

REPORT NO.

50X1

COUNTRY USSR

DATE DISTR. 21 Feb. 1955

SUBJECT Soviet Army Infantry Tactics

NO. OF PAGES 21

DATE OF INFORMATION

REFERENCES:

PLACE ACQUIRED

50X1

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

This report was prepared by a Department of the Army interrogator in response to Soviet Standard Brief No. 10. It is forwarded essentially as received.

Note: Source's knowledge of Soviet infantry tactics was limited, for the most part, to battalion level; however, he could also give some information on regimental-level and, to a lesser degree, on divisional-level tactics. The greatest portion of his tactical knowledge was acquired while he was an officer candidate at the Infantry OCS in Tashkent. Most of the instruction there was based largely on the Tentative Field Service Regulations, 1948 edition (Proyekt Polevogo Ustava). Although source attended OCS from October 1947 to November 1950, the infantry tactics described in this report are in accordance with the latest Soviet doctrines outlined in the Field Service Regulations of 1950 and 1951 (source was not sure of the exact date) which were evolved from the 1948 Tentative Field Service Regulations. To a lesser degree, some of source's knowledge on infantry tactics was derived from field service in the 287th Gds. Rifle Regt., 95th Gds. Rifle Div. Because he was a rifle platoon leader during most of his service and occasionally served as an acting company CO, it must be kept in mind that his knowledge of infantry tactics at battalion level and below will be more precise than that on higher levels.

Training Literature

1. The following manuals, currently used by the Soviet armed forces to outline infantry tactical procedures and techniques were listed by source:
 - a. Field Service Regulations (Polevoy Ustav) - 1950 or 1951 edition - Battalion to corps inclusive, this was the principal tactical manual.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

50X1

b. Combat Regulations (Boyevoy Ustav) - 1950 or 1951 edition - Squad to company inclusive. This manual was the chief manual used in rifle companies.¹

c. Other less important tactical handbooks were:

(1) Tactical Training of the Individual Soldier (Metodika Takticheskoy Podgotovki Soldata)

(2) Tactical Training of the Squad (Metodika Takticheskoy Podgotovki Otdeleniya)

Both of these handbooks were unclassified and were available to any enlisted man.

Changes in Tactics

2. The only changes in tactical training and doctrines known to source since 1947 were those concerning atomic-defense training; his knowledge on this was very limited.²

Attack

3. In the attack, prescribed frontages were:

a. Squad - Up to 40 m,

b. Platoon - Up to 150 m,

c. Company - Up to 500 m,

d. Battalion - Up to 800-1000 m,

4. Types of attack formations included: frontal assault (lobnoye nastupleniye), flanking attack (obkhod), and close envelopment (okhvot). There were other forms of attack but source had forgotten them.

5. Source was familiar only with the frontal attack which was the only tactical formation practiced in his regiment even at regimental level. In this formation, units practiced this form in a line of skirmishers (tsep). As a rule, the company did not have a reserve in the attack. All the rifle platoons, including the company MG platoon which was attached to the rifle platoons, attacked in one line of skirmishers or one echelon.

6. From the rifle battalion on up, it was taught that the attack was in two echelons with two rifle companies forward in the first echelon and the third rifle company following in the second echelon at about 200-300 m. The third company was the battalion reserve and could be thrown into the attack as the situation demanded by the battalion CO with permission of the regimental CO. As soon as the first enemy positions were seized, the two forward companies continued the attack without halting or reorganizing. The third company continued to follow behind the forward elements. In the regiment, there was usually one battalion in reserve which followed behind the two attacking battalions at a distance of 300 m.

7. Source stated that there were still other formations which could be used depending on enemy strength, own troop fire power, weather conditions, and terrain features. Source could not elaborate on the types of formations to be used in these instances.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

50X1

Supporting Weapons

8. As a general rule, any attached weapons came under the direct tactical control of the commander of the rifle unit in question. In the case of mortars, AT pieces, artillery, tanks, and SP guns, these were under the control of the senior artillery commander for the application of the proper artillery techniques so that he might concentrate their fires if needed.

Employment of the Battalion HMGs

9. The battalion MG company was usually broken down among the rifle companies by platoons. The MG platoon might be further broken down when attached to the rifle company or attached exclusively to one rifle platoon. HMGs could be used independently or by pairs depending on the wishes of the rifle company CO. The HMGs joined in the last five minutes of the artillery preparation along with the rifle company weapons. Each rifle company weapon and each HMG fired on the nearest enemy trench at predetermined targets. As the rifle company moved forward in the attack, the HMGs were manhandled forward by bounds. The HMGs picked out targets of opportunity and covered the riflemen as they moved forward. They remained in firing positions for short periods and tried to keep up with the riflemen. They had to be ready to beat off any counterattacks that developed in the pursuit. The HMGs remained with the unit to which they were attached.
10. Control of the HMGs was the responsibility of the rifle CO of the unit to which the HMGs were attached. Communication was carried out by oral commands, runners, or prearranged signals. Because the HMG company was split up, the HMG company CO could join one of the rifle company COs to which the HMGs were attached or he could be at the disposal of the rifle battalion CO. HMGs could support the attack by overhead fire, flanking fire, or by firing at intervals between platoons but, to the best of source's knowledge, only direct fire was employed.

Employment of the 82 mm Mortar Company and the 120 mm Mortar Battery

11. In most cases, the 82 mm mortar company and the 120 mm mortar battery fired as units; both took part in the artillery preparation. The 82 mm mortar company could support only one of the two assault companies of its parent battalion or both if the situation demanded. The regimental 120 mm mortar battery would support one or both assault battalions. Each battalion 82 mm mortar company and the regimental 120 mm mortar battery were assigned two or three targets by the senior artillery commander, who was normally the regimental chief of artillery. These targets were in the immediate enemy front line of trenches.
12. The 82 mm mortar company was emplaced as a battery immediately behind the reserve company of the battalion. Normally, these pieces were emplaced forward of the regimental mortar but, in some cases, could be on the same line. It could be placed on one of the flanks of the battalion. After the first line of enemy trenches had been seized, the mortar company displaced forward as a company. Mortars could be manhandled for short distances but any long distance required vehicular transport. In the meantime, the infantry companies kept moving forward without hesitation and, in the pursuit, the battalion 82 mm mortars stayed behind the battalion reserve company.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

50X1

13. The regimental 120 mm mortar battery was emplaced directly behind the two leading assault battalions and ahead of the reserve battalion in order to support both battalions in the attack. This battery could also be emplaced directly behind one battalion and support only that particular battalion. Source believed that this battery displaced as a battery after the battalions started to press forward after seizing the first line of enemy trenches, just as the battalion 82 mm mortar company did. Source did not know the action of the 120 mm mortar battery in the pursuit. The 120 mm mortar battery emplaced 300-400 m from the frontline troops prior to the attack.
14. Both the 82 mm mortar company and the 120 mm mortar battery set up their own respective OPs in the most advantageous spot. At each OP there was the mortar company CO, one or two observers, and a telephone operator. At the mortar emplacements, one of the mortar company or battery officers was designated as the senior officer. The mortar company and mortar battery commander who were at their respective OPs actually conducted the observation with the help of the other observers at their OP. These two commanders also made all the necessary corrections which were relayed back to the mortar emplacements. The senior officer at the mortar positions relayed, by voice, the corrections to the pieces and gave the fire commands; however, the COs of the mortar units came under direct control of the rifle unit to which they were attached and also to the senior artillery commander. As the attack progressed and the forward infantry unit displaced, the COs of the mortar units relayed firing data and corrections by radio to the mortar emplacements.

Employment of 57 mm AT Guns

15. Both battalion and regimental 57 mm AT guns were placed as far forward as possible between the first and second trenches just before the attack. The trucks that pulled these pieces were located under cover not too far from the pieces. As the assault companies started to move toward the first enemy trenches, the trucks moved out and the 57 mm AT guns hitched up and moved out as close as possible to the assault companies. Because the main role of the 57 mm AT guns was to beat off an enemy tank attack, they remained as close as possible to the forward elements in the pursuit. They could be manhandled for about 100 m if necessary.
16. The 57 mm AT guns were decentralized in the attack and could be used singly or in pairs. The pieces were usually attached down to rifle platoons and came under the command of the platoon to which attached. All the battalion 57 mm AT guns took part in the attack. Source was quite sure that no regimental AT guns were kept back in regimental reserve; and, as far as he knew, the regimental pieces also fully participated in the attack just as the battalion pieces. Only direct fire was used. The 57 mm AT guns took part in the artillery preparation. They were assigned to fire at MG emplacements and other strongpoints in the enemy front line of trenches.

Employment of SPG 82 mm AT Rocket Launchers

17. The SPG 82 mm AT rocket launchers of the rifle battalion were also located as far forward as possible. In some cases, they could be as far forward as 15 m beyond the first trench in a separate emplacement or between the first and second trenches. They were attached to rifle companies. Because there was only one truck to carry these weapons, it was pointed out to source that these weapons should be used in pairs. He stated, however, that they were separated and were manhandled. They loaded only for longer hauls.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-5-

50X1

Employment of the Regimental 76 mm SP Guns

18. The 76 mm SP guns were attached as a battery to one of the attacking battalions and source thought they could be attached as low as a rifle company. Because the main role of the SP guns was to engage enemy tanks, they played a lesser role as a direct fire weapon on enemy emplacements in the first line of trenches. If used in the attack, all the firing was direct. Source did not believe that they were tied in with the division artillery because they moved out in line with the infantry. Although source was not certain, he thought that it was possible that the guns made a limited amount of participation in the artillery preparation. In this case, their fire was coordinated in the regimental fire plan under direction of the regimental chief of artillery.

Employment of AA MGs

19. The battalion ZPU (AA) platoon was used chiefly to protect the battalion CP from air attack. The regimental AAA platoon was also used to protect the regimental CP against air attack. In these instances, they were kept under centralized control. Source did not know how they would be emplaced. The battalion ZPU platoon was more or less a reserve for the battalion CO. The guns could be used against ground targets, in which case they could be decentralized. They could be used to a limited extent against thin-skinned vehicles. Because the CO of the battalion "artillery battery" had his 57 mm AT platoon and the SPG 82 mm platoon detached to the rifle companies, and the ZPU (AA) platoon at the battalion CP, he was at the battalion CO's disposal. In units as low as the rifle battalion, the battalion CO was also considered the "Senior Artillery Commander". He turned to the CO of the battalion artillery battery for technical advice if there was no artillery element attached to the battalion.
20. When used to support the attack, the ZPUs were placed in the forward echelon. They took part in the last five minutes of artillery preparation on predesignated frontline enemy targets and reverted to the control of the battalion commander after the assault companies jumped off. When the battalion ZPUs or the regimental AAA platoon were centralized (protecting the respective CPs), these units displaced forward along with the CPs.

Employment of the Medium Tank-SP Regiment of the Rifle Division

21. The divisional medium tank-SP regiment or the portion of it that was attached to the rifle regiment was located, prior to the attack, one or two kilometers from the front line in tank-attack positions. Tanks and SPs of the regiment moved out from these positions five minutes prior to the lifting of the artillery preparation. The tanks and SPs moved on through the infantry, which immediately moved into the attack behind them as soon as the tanks and SPs moved through it.
22. The organic SPs of the rifle regiment normally were in forward positions prior to the attack or possibly in the tank attack positions with the tanks and SPs of the tank-SP regiment. An entire tank-SP regiment could be placed in support of the rifle regiment although a tank-SP battalion was the more normal attachment. Tanks and SPs could also take a limited part in the artillery preparation before moving out past the infantry; however, it was preferable to have tanks and SPs use only direct fire which was rare.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-6-

50X1

23. The mission of the tank-SP unit was to make a breakthrough, support the infantry attack, and to pursue the withdrawing enemy. There was no stopping at the first line of enemy trenches for reorganization. According to the Field Service Regulations, the infantry, tanks, and SPs were to seize the first line of enemy trenches by a specific time which was always designated by the Cyrillic letter q (which apparently stands for chas-hour). The infantry boarded tanks and SPs in the pursuit only.

Preparation for the Attack

24. The attack was well-planned far in advance. Supplies and reserves were brought forward and constant reconnaissance was maintained. Prior to attacking prepared enemy positions, frontline troops were relieved by the troops that would actually participate in the attack. Relief was carried out at night one or two days prior to the attack. Regimental engineer company sappers cleared paths through minefields the night before the attack and any barbed wire entanglements were removed or cut. All trenches, positions, and firing points were carefully camouflaged with all movement kept to a minimum.
25. The security of the build-up area was the responsibility of the frontline units. An outpost MLR was established to warn units of an unexpected enemy attack. Listening posts were established by the outpost MLR some distance to its front.
26. Because the attacking units were already in place for an impending attack, source repeatedly insisted that there would be no forward assembly areas or concentration areas. He could give no information on possible concentration and build-up areas deep in the rear of the MLR.

Location of Command Posts

27. Platoon leaders were in the first trench or 50 m to the rear of the first trench, company COs were up to 100 m from the front trench, battalion COs were directly behind the second echelon or about 400 m from the front trench, and regimental COs 1.5 to 2 km from the first line of trenches.
28. OPs or CPs were located closer to the front in the attack than in the defense.³ There were several OPs and CPs. One of them was the basic OP or CP, and there were also one or two alternates. The OP or CP, as the case might be, was usually in an earthen dugout. Source knew of no rear CPs on regimental level or lower. In the battalion and regimental CPs or OPs were: the infantry commander, COs of any organic supporting weapons units, COs of any attached units, the chief of staff, and other staff officers. Radio communication was located a short distance from the CP so the operation of the CP was not disturbed. This radio communication point ran wire communication from it to the CP.

General Duties of Personnel at the Command Post

29. The general duties of personnel at the command post were the following:
- To know at all times the situation of both the enemy and friendly units.
 - To make proper recommendations to the CO for the proper employment of units and material.
 - To keep higher headquarters informed of the situation.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-7-

50X1

Duties of the Rifle Company CO

30. Source could give no specific duties of the battalion or higher unit command post personnel nor did he know anything about lateral liaison; however, he was able to enumerate the action and duties of rifle company COs upon the receipt of the field order, which were:
- a. To become familiar with the content of the field order and fully understand the senior commander's intentions. Also, to be aware of the part that his own unit would play in the overall operation and plan the most efficient use of his own time in preparing for the operation.
 - b. To make an estimate of the situation, determining all available information on the enemy situation relative to strength, dispositions, actions, and capabilities. To familiarize himself with the friendly situation to include strength and capabilities of his own troops, their state of combat readiness and any available information of supporting units, the disposition of his unit in the attack, the location of the company ammunition point, and the battalion aid station.
 - c. To make a reconnaissance, orient his location with the map, point out to platoon leaders various orienting points, their sectors of activity, and fire lanes. Also, to designate the proposed location and disposition of defensive fires and to select positions for supporting organic weapons.
 - d. To make his decision, based on his mission and his own troop dispositions, note the line of departure, and inform the battalion commander of his decision.
 - e. To inform his own troops and give them orientation on the unit mission, information on the enemy, information on the friendly situation which included the mission and location of adjacent units, the mission of attached and supporting weapons, the manner of coordination with attached and supporting weapons, if any, unit boundaries, his location during the attack, name of his second in command, communication channels, and types of signals. He would also inform his troops of the time that remained for preparation, the time of attack, location of the company ammunition point, and the battalion aid station.
 - f. Supervise the organization and preparation of his unit for the attack.
 - g. Inform the battalion commander of his readiness.
31. As soon as the attack started, the company and battalion COs displaced from their CPs, which then ceased to exist as such. They followed behind the second echelon and conducted the battle on the move. Regimental CPs displaced forward after the seizure of the first line of enemy trenches.

Objectives

32. The Soviets assumed that, because they occupied a main defense zone consisting of three defense positions, the enemy would do the same. (See page 21)
33. Rifle companies were not given specific objectives to seize but were given a specific portion or sector of the battalion objectives so as not to interfere with each other's fire. In turn, the rifle companies broke down their sectors among their rifle platoons.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-8-

50X1

34. The rifle battalion was given a primary objective (blizhayshaya zadacha) which consisted of the first enemy defense positions. Without halting or reorganizing, the rifle battalion continued forward on to its secondary objective (posleduyushchaya zadacha) which consisted of the enemy's third line of defense, six to eight kilometers deep. This objective was also designated as the regimental primary objective. A minor reorganization could take place at this point. The regiment continued on towards the regimental secondary objective, 15 to 20 km in the enemy depth. This objective was also designated as the division primary objective and usually consisted of some dominant terrain feature or large enemy unit.
35. The rifle division continued the attack until the corps' objective for the day (zadacha dnya) was seized. This objective was up to 30 km in the enemy depth.
36. If little or no resistance was met, the leading battalions which had started the attack were expected to continue forward automatically, even up to the corps objective. After penetrating the enemy's first positions and causing a rout, the troops could board SPs and tanks in the pursuit. If the leading battalions ran into heavy resistance, they were, nevertheless, expected to reach their own unit objectives. Every effort was made to push on further with the corps objective as their ultimate goal but, falling short of this, as far as possible.
37. There was no reorganization on the seizure of the first enemy positions. There could be a minor reorganization after the seizure of the secondary objective but reorganization was normally effected only when the objective for the day was seized. The units then organized the defense (as shown in the defense portion of this report); and, in the event of an enemy counterattack, the leading units were expected to beat it off. The respective commanders committed their reserve to beat off the counterattack only when they received permission of the next higher commander. If the enemy showed a superiority, the unit went into the defense after receiving permission from the next higher commander. It was stressed here by source that the enemy had definitely to have a superiority before the Soviets would go into defense positions; and, normally, it was expected that there would be no stopping until specified objectives were seized. The defense could be momentary so that reserve units following close behind could be committed to carry through the stalled drive.

Combat Teams

38. Combat teams were formed for the purpose of conducting reconnaissance, setting up a separate defensive position in a designated area, defending the outpost MLR of a rifle division front, or attacking on a specified front. Source remembered this last point only as a parroted phrase and could not explain its meaning. The normal combat team was the reinforced rifle battalion. It consisted of one rifle battalion, one or two tank companies, one battalion of division artillery attached, one or two batteries of 76 mm SP guns, up to one company of sappers, and one or two mortar batteries. The CO of the combat team would be the rifle battalion CO.

Communications

39. From company level on upward, the main means of communication was the radio during the attack. Each rifle company was to have an RBM-1 radio tied into the battalion net. Radio operators and radios were provided by the battalion signal platoon. The 82 mm mortar company was also to have the same type of radio at its OP and at the mortar

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-9-

50X1

positions. All units higher than battalion maintained communication by an unknown type of radio. Source could give no definite information on radio communications beyond battalion; however, the battalion 57 mm AT guns, the ZPU platoon, and the SPG 82 mm platoon had no radio communication. Source did not know what type of communication the rifle battalion CO had with the regiment, 120 mm mortar battery, or any attached artillery elements but believed that these commanders would be at his CP with their own communications.

40. Rifle company sub-units had no radio communications and contact at this level was made by voice, runners, signal flags, or by predetermined signal flares of various colors. Units lower than company laid no wire in defense or offense.
41. There was no direct communication between infantry companies and artillery attached to them or between higher infantry units. Because the company CO had a radio, he was in contact with the battalion commander through whom he could request artillery fire. Rifle platoons could contact tanks or SPs only by voice and signals or predetermined flares. The rifle sub-units could use tracer rounds to point out targets to tanks and SPs. Tanks and SPs, when attached to the rifle battalion, could contact the rifle company commanders by switching their radios to the rifle battalion channel and, in this way, be on the battalion network. Source felt that attached tanks or SPs could be on a separate channel to their own CO who would be at the rifle battalion commander's CP with his own radio and could, therefore, relay any messages of the rifle battalion CO to the tanks and SPs.
42. Assault units lower than division had no communications with the air force. Front line units could merely indicate their forward-most positions by the use of air panels and smoke grenades. Source was of the opinion that only the division CG had contact with air support units and had the right to call for air support.
43. A mortar observer could not call for artillery fire. All observers were responsible for reporting by radio to the next higher CP any movement or massing of enemy troops or any enemy tank attack. The infantry battalion CO called for artillery or mortar fire only from those artillery or mortar units attached to him, i.e., as in the case of a combat team. The rifle company CO "requested" artillery or mortar fire from the rifle battalion commander and, in cases where the rifle battalion CO had no attached mortar or artillery elements, he could only "request" such fire from the infantry regiment commander. Normally, only the regimental commanders could call for or lift division artillery fire. Permission to use artillery fire was carried out to ridiculous extremes, according to source. Even in clear-cut cases where the battalion commander could call for artillery fire, source claimed that the battalion commander would normally seek permission first.

Defense

Purpose

44. The Soviet doctrine taught that the defense was used for the following reasons: to mass troops and supplies prior to going into the attack, to defend and hold important objectives, to draw off enemy strength from another sector which would weaken it, to preserve ones own troops, equipment, and supplies because the attack was always more costly than the defense, and to allow other sectors of the front to go into the attack.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
-10-

50X1

Defense Frontages

45. In the defense position the following frontages were normal:

Squad - Up to 150 m.

Platoon - 350-500 m.

Company - 800-1,000 m.

Battalion - 1.5 to 2 km.

Regiment - Up to 4 km.

Defense Positions

46. Defense positions were supposed to be deeply echeloned and prepared for defense against armored, chemical, air attack, and also protected against counterbattery fire. (For the various defense depths from platoon to division see pages 18, 19, and 20.) Trenches were supposed to be 170-180 cm deep and wide enough to pull a Goryunov HMG through laterally. MG firing points, ammunition storage points, squad, and platoon shelters were also constructed in such a manner as not to interfere in a lateral movement. These trenches had overhead shelters and were reinforced whenever possible, and all were connected by a series of connecting trenches; they were always dug in all three positions. Infantry troops did the digging in the rifle battalions under the supervision of the regimental engineer company.
47. The main defense zone of a rifle division consisted of three defense positions, the first position (pervaya pozitsiya), the regimental reserve position (pozitsiya polkovikh rezervov), and the division reserve position (pozitsiya divizionnikh rezervov). Each position consisted of three trenches with connecting passageways between them (See page 20).

Disposition of Organic and Attached Weapons

48. For disposition of organic and attached supporting weapons, see page 20.)

Employment of HMGs

49. HMGs of the battalion were normally split up and attached to the rifle companies. They came under operational control of the rifle company CO and were to be placed in the forwardmost trench.

Employment of 82 mm Mortars

50. The 82 mm mortar company of the rifle battalion was usually under centralized control. It was normally emplaced between the second and third trench of the first positions (see pages 18 and 19). Sometimes, an individual mortar was detached and used as a roving piece (kachayushchiye) in order to deceive the enemy and prevent him from locating the centralized positions of the 82 mm mortars. The 82 mm mortar company prepared concentrations and also final protective fires. In defense, the 82 mm mortar company remained under control of the battalion commander. The 82 mm mortar company commander set up his OPs just as in the attack and called for mortar fire as needed. Normally, the 82 mm mortar commander was located at the battalion CO's OP because the control of the 82 mm mortars was under the rifle battalion CO.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-11-

Employment of 120 mm Mortars

51. The 120 mm mortar battery of the rifle regiment could be attached to one of the rifle battalions or remain in the regimental artillery group supporting both rifle battalions. In either case, the battery remained centralized. Concentrations and final protective fires were prepared. Although source did not know how the fire of the 120 mm mortars was directed and controlled, he was sure that the battery had a fire-direction center known as a yacheyka which meant "cell". In the defense, the 120 mm mortars were echeloned farther back than in the attack. In the attack, the 120 mm mortars were emplaced directly behind the second trench of the first position; in the defense, they were normally behind the third trench of the first position. (See page 20).

Employment of 76 mm SP Guns

52. The 76 mm SPs of the regiment were attached to rifle battalions. The entire regimental SP battery could be attached to only one of the rifle battalions or could be split between the two forward rifle battalions; they are not normally attached in less than pairs. When attached to the battalions, their main role was to engage enemy armor. Source was not sure if SPs were tied in with regimental or divisional artillery but was of the opinion that, in the defense, they were used only as direct fire weapons. When attached to rifle battalions, the SPs were under control of the rifle battalion commander. SPs helped make up a part of the company or battalion anti-tank "knot". (See paragraph 55 below.) If the enemy made a slight penetration, both SPs and any tanks attached together with some elements of infantry counterattacked following a light artillery preparation. Some of the SPs could also be used as roving weapons; however, source did not know if in this case they would fire directly or indirectly.

Employment of 57 mm AT Guns

53. The battalion 57 mm AT guns were the main anti-tank weapons of the rifle battalion and were emplaced, wherever practicable, between the first and second trenches and employed direct fire. The 57 mm AT battery of the rifle regiment attached some of its 57 mm AT guns to the rifle battalion. About two thirds of the pieces, counting both battalion and regiment, were located forward. The remainder were positioned further in depth but, in all cases, direct fire was utilized.

Emplacement of Units

54. In the rifle battalion, two rifle companies occupied the first two trenches. The third rifle company was the battalion reserve and was emplaced in the third trench. The rifle regiment had two battalions forward and one battalion to the back. The battalion in back was the regimental reserve. It occupied a series of three trenches two to two and a half kilometers behind the two front battalions. This battalion also set up "switch positions" to mop up any breakthrough (see page 20). The rifle division had two regiments forward and one regiment held in reserve. The latter regiment also set up a series of three trenches, six to eight kilometers behind the front line units.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-12-

AT Defense Plans

55. In the defense, each rifle company was required to establish a "company anti-tank 'knot'" (rotnyy protivotankovyy oporny punkt), comprising seven to nine anti-tank pieces plus the personnel of the rifle company (see page 18). The rifle battalion established a "battalion anti-tank 'knot'" (batal'onyy protivotankovyy uzel) of up to 30 anti-tank units plus the battalion personnel (see page 19). In each case, the "knots" were planned by the "senior" artillery commander who, source felt, was the regimental chief of artillery. The anti-tank units utilized in the "knots" could be the battalion SPG 82 mm rocket launchers, the battalion 57 mm AT guns, the regimental 57 mm AT guns, the regimental 76 mm SPs, and any attached 76 mm SPs and T-34 tanks from the division. All the weapons in the company and battalion anti-tank "knots" were under the control of the senior artillery commander of the rifle regiment who, under normal circumstances, was the regimental chief of artillery, but source could not elaborate on this plan.
56. The artillery groups were also used as a means of beating off tank attacks. The regimental artillery groups (PAG-Polkovaya Artilleriskaya Gruppa) was emplaced behind the regimental reserve position. Usually, all the organic regimental artillery was in the forward positions, particularly the SPs and 57 mm AT guns; however, the 120 mm mortars were sometimes located far enough in the rear to be included in the regimental artillery group. In most cases, however, the regimental artillery group was composed of attached artillery, not of organic. The division artillery group (DAG-Divizionnaya Artilleriskaya Gruppa) was emplaced behind the division reserve position with 30-40 pieces to cover one kilometer of front in normal situations. Source was very vague on artillery support and tactics and could not elaborate on these points.

Security Outposts

57. Security outposts were set up to warn the main defense zone of any sudden enemy attack and also to keep the enemy from learning the location of the main defense zone. A well-defined trench was dug up to two kilometers forward of the MLR. In addition to this trench, a series of dummy or decoy positions was also dug. A reinforced rifle battalion normally occupied this outpost MLR for the entire division. This battalion was formed from one of the reserve battalions of the division.

Protective Fire

58. Artillery of all types established concentrations and final protective fire. Concentrated fire (sosredotochennyy ogon') was numbered, i.e., SO#1, SO#2, etc. Final protective fire (nepodvizhnyy Zagradytel'nyy ogon') was given the name of an animal, i.e., NZO "bear", NZO "wolf", etc. All mortar units heavier than the 82 mm and all field artillery had a fire-direction center (batariya upravleniye) to direct fire but source could give no information on this.⁴

Mobile Defense

59. Source knew of no mobile defense but claimed that, if a unit had a fairly wide front, the continuous trenches served as a means of maneuvering right or left in the direction of the enemy attack. Source did not know what manner of defense would be used to cover extreme frontages and did not believe that a case existed in which the entire front would not be covered by a system of trenches.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-13-

50X1

Delaying or Retrograde Action

60. Source never received any training in this subject but the entire doctrine presented, up to the time of his defection, placed almost all emphasis on the attack. Source did not remember any literature on retrograde movements. He was under the impression that the Soviets never expected to be forced to use retrograde tactics.

Special OperationsNight Operations

61. Night attacks could be launched with or without an artillery preparation. The element of surprise was preferred, in which case the attack would be without artillery preparation. Objectives were limited and were usually commanding pieces of ground or some enemy strongpoint not too far from the MLR. Source could give no distances but felt it would be only the first enemy trenches, i.e., the equivalent of the Soviet battalion defense positions.
62. Normally, the night attack was conducted by small units, such as a reinforced rifle company. Control was by runners or close contact between the rifle company CO with his platoon leaders. In order to achieve the element of surprise, oral commands had to be kept to a minimum. Signal flares of predetermined colors were used in the final assault. At night, intervals between troops were less than during daylight attacks and the troops wore white markings on their helmets. There was no mention of the use of handkerchiefs or white army bands.
63. Night attacks were launched only after careful reconnaissance of enemy strength and positions. The lanes of approach were selected and reconnoitered to determine the location of enemy outposts. The company making the night attack was relieved and sent to the rear. A similar piece of terrain was selected in the rear for training purposes. Here, each subunit was instructed in its particular role with each soldier made aware of the mission, the manner of attack, etc. Searchlights were not used for illumination, as far as source knew, but flares were used in the final assault. Tanks and SPs were in readiness to enable them to move on order. They followed the infantry at a considerable distance and took part in the battle only as a last resort, moving up when ordered. Mortars, SPGs, and other crew-served weapons that were attached were manhandled in the night attack.
64. The general form of the night attack was the frontal attack; however, if the enemy was outflanked, the flanking attack was used. It was considered very desirable to sneak up to the enemy's MLR and close in hand-to-hand combat in the final assault. If the enemy illuminated the area, the Soviet soldier was instructed to "hit the ground". Once near the enemy defensive positions, the final assault was made with or without the battle cry of "ura" (hurrah).

Mountain Warfare

65. Source received no training in mountain warfare and, to the best of his knowledge, there was no training of this type in the 95th Gds. Rifle Div. He knew, however, of an unidentified mountain rifle brigade which arrived from the Volga Military District at the Tashkent OCS summer camp in summer 1948. At this time, source's class was nearing the end of its summer training period. When the mountain rifle brigade arrived, it took over the Tashkent OCS summer camp as its permanent station and, as a result, the Tashkent OCS was forced to set up their tents about 20 km northwest of the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
-14-

50X1

"Stalin Camp" at Chirchik (N 41-30, E 69-35); however, this entire area was wasteland, and it was not difficult to establish the new camp. Firing ranges were set up for the mountain rifle brigade and, about four kilometers from the new Tashkent OCS summer camp, an artillery-firing range was set up. Source never saw this range but heard the firing and saw 152 mm howitzers move to and from the range.

66. The transportation used by the mountain rifle brigade was half horse and mule with the other half vehicle. Source was certain that the horses were used only for transport purposes and not as mounts for the troops. He noticed that this mountain rifle brigade also had truck-towed 37 mm AA guns and horse-packed mortars. He believed that the latter were 120 mm.

Fortified Zones

67. Assault teams (shturmovaye gruppy) were selected to attack enemy pillboxes or concrete emplacements. They consisted of one rifle platoon, three or four chemical soldiers, three or four sappers, one or two heavy tanks, and up to a platoon of 57 mm AT guns.
68. The mission of the assault team was to tie up the emplacements and demolish it to allow the main forces to pass through. The AT guns fired directly at the emplacements to neutralize their firing points. While the emplacements were engaged by the AT guns, chemical troops moved forward and set up a smoke screen in front of the emplacement. The AT guns then lifted their fire. The remainder of the assault team moved towards the emplacements together with the tanks. The tanks moved ahead of the infantry as close as possible to the emplacement, halted, and engaged the firing ports of the emplacement with their MG's while the infantry encircled the emplacement. The sappers moved out to the emplacement and set up demolition charges and the tanks and sappers pulled back to allow the demolitions to explode. Following the explosion, the infantry moved in on the pillbox for mop-up operations.

River Crossings

69. For making small river crossings, the infantry regiment had certain T/O&E stream-crossing equipment which was found in the regimental engineer company. For crossing large streams or rivers, source believed that heavier engineer river-crossing equipment, such as amphibious tractors, pontoon bridges, and local materials, was used. Source did not know if the division engineer battalion had this equipment; if not, he believed that separate pontoon companies or battalions would be attached to the division for a large river crossing.
70. The size of the group that made these crossings depended on enemy strength. During World War II, small units such as rifle squads, platoons, and companies were used to establish bridgeheads. These units were heavily supported by artillery fire with much attention given to the seizure of a bridgehead.⁵ All personnel who had made a river crossing during World War II and who had held out until the arrival of reinforcements, were given special recognition. Those that remained alive were recognized as "Heroes of the Soviet Union."
71. Light artillery was ferried across rivers in boats as soon as the infantry established a defense. Heavier artillery and armor waited until a bridge was constructed. Source did not know how much time this took, if crossings were made on a narrow or a broad front, or how much time was necessary to plan a deliberate river crossing.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-15-

50X1

Armor supported the river crossing with direct fire at enemy emplacements on the opposite bank but source did not know how the armored fire was tied in or coordinated with artillery fire.

72. River crossings could be made during the day or during the night; however, it was preferable that they be made at night. In this case, the crossing could be made without the aid of supporting weapons in order to achieve the element of surprise. During daylight river-crossing operations, smoke screens were laid by the regimental chemical unit with the use of smoke pots. Source did not know if artillery or airplanes were used to set up these smoke screens. Air support was always used to support a river-crossing and later to hold the beachhead but source did not know how it would be coordinated.
73. Source could give no example of a typical river crossing. His own training in this type of operation was very limited and he knew nothing concerning the order of crossing or any phases involved in establishing a bridgehead. He participated only once in a limited river crossing exercise.⁶

Airborne Tactics

74. Source had never received any training in airborne tactics and could give no information.

Forests and Swamps

75. There was no special equipment in source's regiment for operation in swamps or forests and the unit received little special training in forest or swamp operations. Troops were told that trenches should be dug 150-200 m from the edge of forests or 200-300 m inside the forest. Trees were felled to serve as anti-tank barriers and AT guns were placed in the front lines in small numbers. The remaining guns were held back in reserve. Source's knowledge of forest operations was very limited and he could give no information on tactical disposition, artillery fires, control, formation, sizes, etc. The only information known to source on operations in swamps was that, "foxholes would be constructed above ground from rocks, logs, or other accessible materials."

Infantry Training⁷

76. One-third of all physical training was devoted to the use of the bayonet. This training was given mostly during the winter training period. The Soviet soldier was taught that when the enemy could not be stopped by fire, the bayonet would be used to fight off all counter-attacks and that the bayonet was to be used during night attacks when the element of surprise was desired.

50X1

50X1

1. Cf. [] for further information of these manuals.
2. Cf. [] for information on atomic defense training.
3. [] Comment: OPs of regiments and higher were also known as command posts. 50X1
4. [] Comment: The use of the term, "batareya", here should not be confused with its normal meaning of a company-sized artillery unit. In this case, it merely means "team". 50X1
5. [] Comment: Source did not know the size of a bridgehead before a bridge was constructed. 50X1
- 50X1. Cf. [] paragraph 80, for further details of the river-crossing exercise.
7. Cf. [] for all infantry training known to source, including marksmanship. 50X1

CONFIDENTIAL

















CONFIDENTIAL

-16-

50X1

Soviet Army Tactical Signs and Symbols

The following represent only a small percentage of the symbols which source recalled as being listed in the Combat Regulations (Squad-Company), either the 1950 or 1951 edition.

<u>English</u>	<u>Russian</u>
 Co MG (light)	Ruchnoy Pulemet
 HMG	Stankovyy Pulemet
 82-mm Mort	82-mm Minomet
 120-mm Mort	120-mm Minomet
 Mort Plat (82-mm)	Minometnyy Vzvod
 Mort Co (82-mm)	Minometnaya Rota
 Tank	Tank
 Heavy Tank	Tyazhelyy Tank
 SP Artillery	Samokhodnaya Artilleriskaya Ustanovka
 Field Gun (Source did not know what symbol, if any, was used to distinguish a field gun from a howitzer.)	Orudiye
 AT Gun	Protivotankovoye Orudiye
 OP	Nablyudatel'nyy Punkt
 Bn CP	Komandnyy Punkt Batalona
 Regtl CP (*Note: Flag bore unit designation on it.)	Komandnyy Punkt Polka
 Rifle Squad in the Attack	Otdeleniye V Nastupleniye
 Rifle Platoon in the Attack	Vzvod V Nastupleniye

CONFIDENTIAL

50X1

CONFIDENTIAL

-17-



English

Russian



Rifle Company in the attack

Rota V Nastupleniye




Barbed Wire Fortifications in Three Rows

Provolochnyye Zagrazhdeniya V Tri Ryada Kol'yev




Mine Field
(Source did not know what symbols distinguished AP mines from AT mines.)

Minnoye Pole



Trench Outline
Decoy or Dummy Positions

Nachertaniye Transhey
Lozhnyye Pozitsii



Company AT defense position and battalion AT defense center of resistance

Rotnyy Protivotankovyy
Opornyy Punkt i Batal'onnyy Protivotankovyy Uzel



Reinforced Concrete Pillbox

DOT - Dolgovremennaya
Oboronitel'naya Tochka



Tank Company in the Attack

Tankovaya Rota V
Nastupleniye



Artillery Positions

Artilleriyskiye
Pozitsii



Defense Zone Fire

NZO - Nepodvishnyy
Zagraditel'nyy Ogon'



Artillery Concentrations

SO - Sosredotochenyy
Ogon'

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL


-18-

50X1

Rifle Company in Defensive Positions

Front - 800-1000 m.

Can be Attached - 1-2 platoons from Bn MG Co, 1-2 57-mm AT Guns, up to a company of 82-mm Mortars, 1-2 platoons of T-34 tanks or SP (76-mm) guns, up to a platoon of SPG 82s, up to a squad of flamethrowers (from a separate flamethrower company which would be attached to a division from GHQ reserve troops.)



CONFIDENTIAL

50X1

CONFIDENTIAL


-19-

Rifle Battalion in Defensive Positions

Front - Up to 2 km.

Defensive Depth - Up to 1.5 km.

Can be Attached - 1-2 57-mm AT batteries, 1-2 companies of T-34 tanks or SP (76-mm) guns, up to a battalion of artillery (120-mm) and up to a platoon of flamethrowers (from a separate flamethrower company which would be attached to a division from GHQ reserve troops).



CONFIDENTIAL


50X1

CONFIDENTIAL


-20-

Main Defense Zone (Glavnaya Polosa Obozrony)

Outpost MLR



First Positions MLR




Battalion Reserve Positions (usually one rifle regiment)


2-2.5 km

Positions of regimental reserve (one rifle battalion)

6-8 km



Positions of division reserve (one rifle regiment)



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-21-

50X1

Objective Depths in Soviet Offensive Operations